North Korea’s reaction to ROK-U.S. Joint Military Exercises and negotiation behavior

Abstract

North Korea unilaterally suspended inter-Korean dialogue several times under the pretext of the ROK-US combined military exercise. This study aims to reveal that North Korea intends to engage in negotiating behavior to secure leverage in negotiations. To this end, this study analyzed the cases of inter-Korean negotiations during the ROK-US combined military exercise by dividing into cases of inter-Korean negotiations and cases of normal progress. The ROK-US combined military exercises were limited to large-scale joint exercises (such as FS and UFS). We set the analysis period was divided into Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un’s reign in consideration of the influence of North Korea’s supreme leaders. As a result, we derived the following four lessons. First, North Korea carried out inter-Korean negotiations even during the same ROK-US combined military exercise period or sometimes engaged in inconsistent negotiation behavior. Second, North Korea used inter-Korean negotiations, which were suspended during the joint military exercise, as a means of buying time by resuming them after the military exercise, but after a considerable period of time. Third, North Korea tends to suspend inter-Korean negotiations more than it does during the ROK-US combined military exercise since its first nuclear test in 2006. Based on these four lessons, we believe that North Korea has used the ROK-US combined military exercise as a leverage for negotiations.