A historical evaluation of the Battle of Pyongyang in the Korean War through a tactical fault analysis

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to consider the ‘Battle of Pyongyang’ of the I Corps during the Korean War from the historical point of view. This study argues that there are some limit to the U.N. military’s ‘Battle of Pyongyang’ that it failed to maximize the benefits of recapturing Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. And this can be evidenced by some notable tactical faults that the 1 Corps has caused in ‘Battle of Pyongyang’. First, the I Corps (America’s First Corps) excessively delayed its time during the ‘Battle of Pyongyang’. Second, the 24th U.S. Infantry Division was excluded from the ‘Battle of Pyongyang’ and failed to concentrate its combat capabilities. Third, I Corps did not besiege the North Korean army, and North Korean could escape from Pyongyang. The I Corps was fiercely competitive to arrive in Pyongyang first, and failed to make efforts to contribute to higher-level operations. In conclusion, this study finds some lesson from the I Corps’s tactical faults behind the glory of ‘Battle of Pyongyang’.